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Since March 2019, municipalities in Ontario have become increasingly conscious of the role of local 
government in addressing the global climate emergency. Although minor departmental initiatives such as 
green infrastructure development policies are understood as environmentally conscious, the larger policy 
network of municipal governance has only recently entered the climate change mitigation and adaptation 
policy field. Declarations of climate emergencies are a modern way for municipal governments to signal 
both interest and intended action in climate change policies. In one year, Ontario municipal climate 
emergencies increased from 0 to 47, with the 47 municipalities representing nearly 90% of Ontario’s 
population. Such interest prompted this analysis of the policymaking structure of local government and 
the means by which climate change policy could be introduced and implemented. Policymaking and 
capacity theories are used to determine how municipalities can work with upper levels of government 
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Multilevel governance and the policy process are often discussed with regard to the capacity, role, and 
influence of local government. Constitutionally, Canada’s municipal governments may be considered “an 
ideological construct” (Good 2019) at large, due to their status as provincially mandated corporations 
with predominantly non-partisan elected officials. Traditional thought also assumes a “policy taking” 
rather than “policy making” responsibility for municipal policy analysts (Gore 2010) due to the character 
of municipalities under provincial and federal jurisdiction in Canada (Côté and Fenn 2014). As the lowest 
level of government, municipalities are not awarded the same breadth of capacity or influence in policy 
implementation as their federal and provincial counterparts, resulting in a sense of stagnation or sub-
standard permanence regarding policy making as a tool for decision making and problem solving. This is 
not to say that Ontario’s municipalities do not have a policymaking role. Indeed, municipal policy making 
is a democratic duty of elected councilors (Municipal Act 2001 SO c 25 s 224), while subsequent policy 
research and implementation are responsibilities of non-elected municipal staff (s 227). Much like its 
overall governance perception, municipal policy must contend with limited capacity and influence relative 
to other municipalities, regional governments, and the Province.  
 The purpose of this research is to demonstrate the policy making capacity of municipalities in the 
context of the climate crisis. This research builds on existing emergency management (see Henstra 2013; 
Labadie 2011; Comfort 2007), intergovernmental relations (see Côté and Fenn 2014; Good 2019) and 
climate change mitigation governance (see Smart 2019; Gaddy, Clark and Ryan 2014) studies, adding the 
element of Climate Emergency declaration and subsequent action to the discussion of multilevel 
governance and policymaking in Ontario. Emergency management policy has been on stark display 
throughout 2020 as all levels of government have struggled to address the multifaceted nature of living 
through global health, economic, and political crises. As global governance structures continue to adapt 
to the reality and permanency of emergency management, municipalities are positioned to expand their 





management. Numerous Canadian municipalities have declared Climate Emergencies as a first response 
measure, including 47 Ontario municipalities as of March 2020 (see Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1: Declared Municipal Climate Emergencies Over Time 
 
 While the figure represents less than 11 per cent of the total number of municipalities in Ontario, the 
collective population of the municipalities represents nearly 90 per cent of Ontario, as large single tier 
and upper tier cities and regions have agreed to prioritized climate crisis management (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Alphabetical List of Ontario Municipalities who have officially declared a Climate Emergency 
 




Amherstburg, Town of Lower Tier Essex 2019-11-12 23,239 
Barrie, City of Single Tier Simcoe 2019-10-07 149,302 
Brampton, City of Lower Tier Peel 2019-06-05 696,975 
Brant, County of Single Tier Brant 2019-11-26 38,419 
Brantford, City of Single Tier Brant 2019-11-12 104,902 
Burlington, City of Lower Tier Halton 2019-04-23 190,194 
Caledon, Town of Lower Tier Peel 2020-01-28 75,969 
Central Elgin, Municipality of Lower Tier Elgin 2019-10-28 13,812 
Chatham-Kent, Municipality of Single Tier Chatham-Kent 2019-07-15 105,666 
Clarington, Municipality of Lower Tier Durham 2020-03-02 100,562 
Cobourg, Town of Lower Tier Northumberland 2019-11-25 20,170 





Goderich, Town of Lower Tier Huron 2020-01-13 8,115 
Greater Sudbury, City of Single Tier Sudbury 2019-05-28 168,813 
Halton Hills, Town of Lower Tier Halton 2019-05-06 64,290 
Halton, Regional Municipality of Upper Tier Halton 2019-09-11 548,435 
Hamilton, City of Single Tier Hamilton 2019-03-27 574,263 
Kenora, City of Single Tier Kenora 2019-09-17 15,483 
King, Township of Lower Tier York 2019-07-08 26,593 
Kingston, City of Single Tier Frontenac 2019-03-05 135,204 
Kitchener, City of Lower Tier Waterloo 2019-06-24 26,790 
London, City of Single Tier Middlesex 2019-04-23 426,139 
Meaford, Municipality of Lower Tier Grey 2019-11-18 11,694 
Milton, Town of Lower Tier Halton 2019-07-22 129,334 
Mississauga, City of Lower Tier Peel 2019-06-19 769,050 
Newmarket, Town of Lower Tier York 2020-01-13 89,496 
Niagara-on-the-Lake, Town of Lower Tier Niagara 2020-02-24 18,865 
Oakville, Town of Lower Tier Halton 2019-06-24 212,551 
Ottawa, City of Single Tier Ottawa 2019-04-24 1,028,514 
Peel, Regional Municipality of Upper Tier Peel 2019-10-24 1,484,000 
Peterborough, City of Single Tier Peterborough 2019-09-23 86,469 
Pickering, City of Lower Tier Durham 2019-12-16 98,817 
Prince Edward, County of Single Tier Prince Edward 2019-05-28 25,406 
Sarnia, City of Lower Tier Lambton 2019-06-17 74,779 
St. Catharines, City of Lower Tier Niagara 2019-04-29 141,294 
St. Thomas, City of Single Tier Elgin 2020-02-10 41,795 
Stratford, City of Single Tier Perth 2020-02-10 33,434 
Tecumseh, Town of Lower Tier Essex 2019-12-10 24,064 
Thunder Bay, City of Single Tier Thunder Bay 2020-01-13 112,740 
Toronto, City of Single Tier Toronto 2019-10-02 2,965,713 
Vaughan, City of Lower Tier York 2019-06-04 325,678 
Waterloo, Regional Municipality of Upper Tier Waterloo 2019-10-09 583,500 
West Nipissing, Municipality of Single Tier Nipissing 2019-04-23 15,014 
Whitby, Town of Lower Tier Durham 2019-06-24 136,594 
Wilmot, Township of Lower Tier Waterloo 2019-09-23 21,978 
Windsor, City of Single Tier Essex 2019-11-18 324,048 






 Climate emergencies have become increasingly popular around the world and at all levels of 
government from local to national. Although motivation to declare among Ontario municipalities is 
indeterminable as of yet, the sustained growth in local government interest represents a need for a 
reconsideration of policymaking roles and norms at the municipal level.  While the declaration of a 
Climate Emergency does not inherently solve any assumed or anticipated emergencies associated with 
climate change, the framing of climate change as an emergency functions as a signal to legislators and 
policymakers. The policy process for emergency management policy is a unique policy field for all levels of 
government, although especially for municipalities as policymaking is not a clearly defined responsibility 
nor a familiar one for many smaller local governments. Although noted in the Municipal Act, 2001, 
policymaking is legislated as a role for councilors with no further description other than development and 
evaluation; the relevant or allowed subjects, jurisdictions, and general capacities of policymaking are 
simply referred to as within the scope of the municipality’s interests (s 8[1]).  
 Clarity though, is not necessarily a product of a defined subject, as emergency management 
policies can be as ambiguous as the term itself. Emergencies, the style of management, and the gravity of 
policy are each inconsistently or rigorously defined in the public and professional discourse (Juillet and 
Koji 2014). Intergovernmental policymaking may suffice in certain circumstances, where municipalities 
are consulted or have extended decision making powers, as in the case of provincial development and 
planning policy working to guide municipal development rather than directly oversee.1 No Climate 
Emergency Provincial Policy Statement exists at this time, however, and the Province has not directed 
municipalities to create a benchmarking system to measure provincial climate policy commitments. 
Climate Emergency governance and policymaking, therefore, is both an uncharted and a pertinent 
opportunity for municipalities.  
 





 The following analysis outlines the role of emergency management and policy from a multilevel 
governance perspective. The provincial and federal relationship to municipalities in relation to an 
emergency declaration is studied in order to highlight the successes of intergovernmental cooperation 
and the drawbacks of unclear and undefined power delegations. This discussion of intergovernmental 
cooperation lends to the thesis of intergovernmental dependence and provides a foundation for 
understanding the climate emergency as it has manifested at the local level in Ontario. The existing 
footprint of emergency policy in Ontario reveals the viability of an expanded role for municipalities should 
climate emergencies be considered in a traditional emergency management style. The analysis 
culminates in a discussion of policy capacity and governance theory to provide municipalities with the 
means to assess capacity from a climate policy perspective. This research demonstrates how and when 
municipalities are able to develop and implement policy and the interdependence of governments in 
creating policy at the local level. 
Multilevel Governance and Policymaking 
The Municipal Role: Issue Identification Through Process Norms 
The role of a municipality in the policymaking process is acknowledged and understood through the lens 
of provincial oversight, despite the complexity of municipal governance and policy not being outlined or 
defined in a productive or comprehensive manner. From the multiple levels of government within this 
lowest level of government, to the number of channels available for policy promotion and enaction, the 
policy process for municipalities in Ontario remains significantly more nuanced than that of its provincial 
and federal counterpart. Municipalities are tasked with observing a network of issues available for policy 
consideration and measuring the risk of policy action, as with any other level of government, yet without 
the formal designation or authority of a provincial or federal government. 
 Although generally irrelevant in the context of this analysis as diffusion and correlation between 
municipal government tiers is outside the scope of this research, understanding the role of Ontario’s 





normative procedures for policy action. Ontario’s municipal legislation footprint is large, looming, and is a 
primary reason for the growth of conventional, consorted, normative governance activity among 
municipalities. However, the non-normative (i.e. formal laws and regulations) legislated impact Ontario 
has over its municipalities includes defining the scope of authority delegated to single-, upper-, and 
lower-tier municipalities. Section 10(2) of the Municipal Act, 2001 affords single-tier municipalities the 
power to pass by-laws in the following areas:   
1. Governance structure of the municipality and its local boards. 
2. Accountability and transparency of the municipality and its operations and of its local boards 
and their operations. 
3. Financial management of the municipality and its local boards. 
4. Public assets of the municipality acquired for the purpose of exercising its authority under this 
or any other Act. 
5. Economic, social and environmental well-being of the municipality, including respecting 
climate change. 
6. Health, safety and well-being of persons. 
7. Services and things that the municipality is authorized to provide under subsection (1). 
8. Protection of persons and property, including consumer protection. 
9. Animals. 
10. Structures, including fences and signs. 
11. Business licensing. 2006, c. 32, Sched. A, s. 8; 2017, c. 10, Sched. 1, s. 1. 
 
Similarly, section 11(2) and 11(3) of the Municipal Act provides lower-tier and upper-tier municipalities 
the same by-law creating powers in the same areas, in addition to the following areas outlined in section 
11(3): 
1. Highways, including parking and traffic on highways. 
2. Transportation systems, other than highways. 
3. Waste management. 
4. Public utilities. 
5. Culture, parks, recreation and heritage. 
6. Drainage and flood control, except storm sewers. 
7. Structures, including fences and signs. 
8. Parking, except on highways.2 
 
While the areas are similar for all three tiers of municipal government, the scope, or “sphere of 
jurisdiction”, in which a by-law may be created, applied, or nullified varies. Subsections four through eight 
 
2 Further stipulations are addressed in the legislation, however for the purpose of this research, the above 





and subsection 11 of section 11 of the Municipal Act are written to address the varying exceptions and 
applications of by-laws created by lower- and upper-tier municipalities. As well, subsections three 
through five of section 10 address the same variation for single-tier municipalities. That is to say, 
conclusively, the ambiguity surrounding multilevel municipal by-law creation is written into the legislation 
governing such creation. 
 The municipal role in policymaking and governance is further complicated by the language used 
to delegate authority. The Municipal Act, as noted above, confers powers to municipalities to pass by-
laws. By-laws differ from policies, and both differ from resolutions, all of which are used interchangeably 
and under the scope of authority delegated to municipalities under various sections of the Municipal Act. 
Essentially, by-laws are pieces of municipal legislation that govern actions within the municipality and can 
result in legal consequences for non-compliance; policies may provide guidance or governance to staff, 
councillors, or citizens and are typically included in municipal official plans; and, resolutions are records of 
council deliberation and, while less formal, “often express the municipality’s position on issues or 
concerns about existing government policy” (Public Health Ontario 2014; Ministry of Municipal Affairs 
and Housing 2019). From a governance perspective, by-laws are therefore the most legally binding, 
followed by policies, and then resolutions, however all reflect the democratic process of issue 
consideration and decision making. 
 As policymaking is the subject of this analysis, the linguistic significance of the term “policy” is 
aptly considered. Municipalities are not bound to a governing style as made evident by the suggestive 
enforcement of by-law creation in the Municipal Act, in addition to the various options for council 
decision making. With regard to municipal policies, the Municipal Act does acknowledge that 
municipalities have polices, but does not address the creation and implementation process in the same 
extensive manner in which by-law creation is addressed. As well, the Municipal Act equates resolutions to 





legislation (see sections 23.1 [3], 23.4 [1], 44 [14], and 190 [1 c, d]). This congruence is in conflict with the 
definitions provided by the Province quoted above, as resolutions reflect issue positions and by-laws 
reflect a method of legal recourse for a municipality. While section 8 of the legislation allows for broad 
interpretation of the Municipal Act by municipalities, the strong enforcement in some areas of 
governance and not in others creates a discrepancy in understanding how and when municipalities may 
develop and implement policies. Despite this uncertainty, normative governance has provided a 
foundation for municipalities from which to work, as upper-, single-, and lower-tier governments have 
assumed similar roles across the province and delegated authority within the municipal structure in order 
to accommodate any ambiguity (Taylor 2016, 12). And while normative behaviour has been sufficient, 
norms surrounding municipal climate governance do not yet altogether exist.  
 Taylor (2016) writes that process-oriented governance is predicated on norms, as the 
policymaking process demands the competence and capacity provided by normativity. However, the 
novelty of municipal climate policymaking has not yet created its own norms. Ontario municipalities 
began declaring Climate Emergencies in March of 2019, and no measurable or comparable policy 
outcomes or initiatives resulting from the declarations are available yet. The role of municipal governance 
in policymaking is ambiguous and could be said to rely on supportive norms. Normativity is not inherently 
an unsuitable precedent, rather it merely does not have a place in the climate governance conversation 
at this time. The process of creating, testing, and adhering to norms is time intensive and climate policy 
must be more reactive if not proactive. This research posits that municipalities are poised to undertake a 
stronger policymaking role in the understudied area of climate emergency preparedness and mitigation. 
And if the existing role of municipal governance is either austerely ambiguous or reliant on process 
norms, a new means for policymaking is a necessity for novel climate change policy solutions. 
The Federal Role: Climate Governance 
Ambiguity, though, does not exist solely at the municipal level within and between tiers. The consensus 





and redefined by the federal government. Recent redefinition in 2004 saw the New Deal for Cities and 
Communities from the Martin Liberal Government in an effort to assist in climate mitigation and 
adaptation measures. The financial and social commitment to assist municipal governments with 
infrastructure development and community building is one of the earlier consolidated efforts to include 
municipalities in the discussion and action of climate change mitigation, as the New Deal was developed 
with context from Canada’s recent Kyoto Protocol commitments in the early 2000s (Shaker 2004). The 
New Deal, while not an emergency policy, does stress some urgency in the climate change conversation 
between government actors and policy makers. The following discussion reviews the role of the federal 
government in creating, adapting, and/or promoting municipal climate governance interests since 2004 
with a focus on how Liberal and Conservative governments have addressed municipalities and what 
municipalities have been able to accomplish over 16 years of federal policy fluctuation. 
 The role of the federal government relative to municipal policymaking is not to provide a 
framework within which municipalities may interpret and develop a normative understanding of 
legislation best practices. Rather, the federal government acts in a more acute and objective manner, 
imposing initiatives and policies for municipalities to accept. Federal-municipal governance can operate in 
such a controlled manner due to the broadly comprehensive nature of federal policy, which must account 
for national needs over local demands (Horak 2012, 349). However, the nature of climate change as a 
global emergency, dependent on the acknowledgement and action from everyone, demands national 
leadership for climate action diplomacy. Federal initiatives addressing climate change are created for 
international compliance yet must be enacted through local means. This indirect relationship can limit the 
effectiveness of federal agreements. 
 Cities account for over 70% of global emissions (Federation of Canadian Municipalities 2020a). 
This does not mean that municipal government operations are detrimental to climate change mitigation 





cities contribute to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions at a far greater scale than the operations in rural 
areas. Without a strong policy and action relationship between municipalities and the federal 
government, commitments to reduce national emissions by 30% below 2005 emission levels by 2030 
(Environment and Climate Change Canada 2020) will not be possible. The key issue regarding the federal 
question in the context of this research is, how does federal climate governance policy include and 
support municipalities? And, if it does not include or support municipalities, how can they engage with 
the policy in a meaningful way?  
 While not directly supportive of or associated with municipalities in most instances, the recent 
efforts of the Liberal federal government, such as the Canada Infrastructure Bank and Paris Agreement 
commitments, have demonstrated a willingness to address climate change as an issue and a crisis, and 
has opened a policy window for climate action policy development. Federal partisanship is not a 
significant topic of a discussion in this analysis, and is only relevant in the context of highlighting the 
relationship between the policy process and the level of government at which it takes place. Climate 
change, despite increasing efforts from the scientific community to provide and communicate the 
imminent crisis caused by the Anthropocene, is a partisan political issue. The urgency at which climate 
change must be mitigated and planned for is a matter that can be traced on the political spectrum, with 
Canada’s current Liberal leadership placing more urgency with the matter than the former Conservative 
federal leadership. This tracing is most easily understood through the procedural process of Bill C-311, a 
federal climate action that intended to set targets for emission reductions at a national level through 
mitigation regulations. Bill C-311, the Climate Change Accountability Act, was ultimately not accepted by 
the Senate, without debate, after nearly two and a half years of consideration by the House Standing 
Committee on the Environment and Sustainable Development. From its introduction in June 2008 
through its dissolution in November 2010, the federal Conservative government was not supportive of 





outcome of Bill C-311, which was the only climate change mitigation-related legislation at the time 
(Climate Action Network Canada 2011; Galloway 2010).  
 While emergency policy and climate action for municipalities is not dictated or addressed by the 
federal government, federal leadership on climate change is becoming increasingly relevant and 
demanded. As cities move forward in declaring climate emergencies, the relationship between municipal 
policymaking and federal climate action commitments should be reassessed. Climate change mitigation 
and adaptation does not occur in a vacuum and requires extensive multilevel government cooperation. 
The tools for policy coordination between the federal and municipal governments are further discussed in 
later capacity analyses, however the above discussion on federal initiatives provides necessary context as 
to how the policy ideas have been and may be interpreted.  
The Provincial Role: Financing Policy 
As the intermediate level between municipal and federal government, the provincial role in the policy 
process is directive, both in terms of the legal and financial authority provinces maintain over 
municipalities (Henstra 2018). The federal government’s disengagement with municipalities requires 
provinces and territories to manage their legislative discretion in order to provide for both the existence 
and success of municipal operations and governance. Despite the growth of Ontario’s cities as 
international urban centers and the moves toward greater municipal self-governing powers in the 
Municipal Act, 2001 and charter city suggestions, Ontario remains “firmly in control” of municipal 
governments, especially in terms of policymaking and policy financing (Côté and Fenn 2014, 3; Siegel and 
Tindal 2006). While the policymaking powers of municipalities have been previously considered, the 
following discussion focuses less on the limitations of the policy process for municipalities and more on 
the financial responsibility of Ontario as a policymaking body. 
 Much of the existing literature on provincial policymaking for municipalities in Ontario is critical 
of the power imbalance between the government levels. Côté and Fenn (2014) discuss the contention of 





government actors as larger cities become urban economic development centers, and that the 
antiquated understanding of provincial oversight in municipal policy must be adjusted. Provincial-
municipal relations present a theoretical arena for management theory debate, whether the traditional 
New Public Management ideas of efficiency and privatization or more recent ideas from New Public 
Service’s more personalized resident-focused approach are better suited to address the needs of a 
multilevel democratic venue (Mintzberg and Bourgault 2000). While this research does not present 
quantitative evidence supporting a relationship management strategy that combines the interests of both 
Ontario and its municipalities, the following explanation of the provincial policy process does provide a 
lens to examine the provincial role in municipal climate emergency management. 
 Examining the provincial policy role provides the clearest understanding of how municipalities 
may use climate emergencies to become policy entrepreneurs. Since Ontario is the primary legislative 
body overseeing municipal operations, authority to develop and implement policies at the municipal level 
must be contained within the context of provincial legislation. Impediments to municipal policymaking 
authority are contained in, but not restrained to, the language of provincial legislation that limits the 
scope and role of municipal governance. Particularly surrounding the policy area of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, “issues of finance and autonomy” (Gore 2010, 31) are at the forefront. 
Policymaking requires policy financing as part of the change implementation process. In 2017, the City of 
Toronto estimated that climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts over the coming years would 
cost between $320 million and $886 million (Carvalho 2018, 11). Detailed budgets for projects, programs, 
and policies planned by Toronto over the period are not within the scope of this research, however the 
overall cost helps to highlight the demand for municipal action and the need for provincial assistance. 
Henstra (2018) describes the provincial-municipal policymaking relationship as “relatively stable and 





occur through various methods and on multiple subjects, the process and subsequent policy is 
nevertheless normative, risk-averse, and subject to intense and direct scrutiny.  
 Such policy characteristics are reflective of the conservative financial state of municipalities (Côté 
and Fenn 2014). Municipalities are obligated to manage budgets and spending in accordance with 
provincial legislation and standards, ultimately limiting the fiscal capacity of policymaking. A notable 
example of provincial shortcomings in municipal policy financing is in infrastructure and asset 
management and maintenance. Municipalities are often criticized for the challenges that come with 
maintaining the significant capital asset that is physical infrastructure (such as bridges, road, and 
municipally-owned land) (Bird and Slack 2018), leading to greater involvement and assistance from 
Ontario’s government. However, the introduction of asset management legislation such as Ontario 
Regulation 588/17 did not provide the financial assistance assumingly desired, and rather requires 
municipalities to update existing asset management strategies in order to more efficiently plan for 
lifecycle costing of infrastructure assets (Asset Management Planning for Municipal Infrastructure, O Reg 
588/17). Asset management policy from the provincial government was created due to the fiscal burden 
municipal infrastructure disrepair could cause the province, while municipalities continue to struggle with 
infrastructure maintenance financing (Côté and Fenn 2014, 43). Based on this precedent, it is not difficult 
to imagine Ontario providing insufficient policy solutions for climate emergencies, especially considering 
the close association between infrastructure and climate mitigation and adaptation (Carvalho 2018). One 
facility where provincial policy and financial assistance converge is in the Ontario Financing Authority’s 
Green Bond development lending program, however bureaucratic barriers limit the effectiveness of 
Green Bonds in Ontario and have consequently not be widely adopted by municipalities (Carvalho 2018, 
24). 
 The provincial role in municipal policymaking is greater than that of the federal government, both 





direction on all matters of governance, including those with limited policy precedent. Climate emergency 
declarations are increasingly popular throughout Ontario, from the largest cities and regions (Toronto, 
Peel) to very small towns (Clarington, Meaford). While governance autonomy would aid municipalities in 
developing policy more freely, climate change action is not centred on provincial-municipal power 
struggles. The multilevel approach to policymaking that currently exists requires far more collaboration 
from the multiple levels. The ambiguity of Ontario’s municipal policymaking network may be diminished 
if, as governments move forward addressing climate change-related emergencies, municipal 
governments are provided greater legislative and financial liberty to pursue policy solutions. 
Acts, Bills, and a Memorandum 
Emergency Legislation in Ontario 
Due to apparent barriers attributed to intergovernmental and multilevel bureaucratic ambiguity, climate 
emergencies and climate change may appear out of scope. However, emergency policy as it exists at the 
federal and provincial levels provides a plausible framework for climate change mitigation, adaptation, 
and prevention. Emergency preparedness and planning legislation such as the federal Emergencies Act, 
1985 and Emergency Management Act, 2007 each address a potential state of emergency governance. 
While these Acts do not directly address municipal governance, the network within which emergency 
policy is contrived must be considered moving forward in addressing the global climate emergency. 
Additionally, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), 
the Ontario provincial Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, 1990, and the recent Ontario 
Coronavirus (COVID-19) Support and Protection Act, 2020, are either directly related to or greatly involved 
with municipal governance and autonomous policymaking. 
 Emergency legislation exists at all three levels of government in Canada and is codified for the 
national and provincial governments. Declarations of emergencies and invocations of emergency 
legislation trigger something of a domino effect of aid availability and temporary special powers to 





government. The Emergencies Act, 1985 exists to allow the federal government to take “special 
temporary measures” in order to ensure national public welfare remains intact (Emergencies Act, RSC 
1985, c 22 [4th Supp]). Similarly, the Emergency Management Act, 2007 further outlines ministerial 
responsibilities and actions to be taken in the event of an emergency in order to mitigate, prepare for, 
respond to, and/or recover from national emergencies (Emergency Management Act, SC 2007, c 15, s 2). 
The 1985 and 2007 emergency related Acts are similar in intent and purpose, differing primarily in how 
power is delegated and the scope in which powers can be used. For example, the Emergencies Act 
requires federal consultation with lieutenant governors prior to federal powers being implemented within 
a province (s 14, s 25) and cannot invoke or involve police authority within provinces, even if the province 
relies on RCMP police powers (s 20). The Emergency Management Act, alternatively, is more of a job 
description for the federal Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, outlining the various 
duties of the role in section 4 of the Act. Both pieces of federal legislation address the international 
community and the potential need for a coordinated international response to an emergency, but do not 
address coordination with municipal governments, assumingly due to the provincial capacity to oversee 
municipal matters in the event of an emergency. Neither the 1985 or 2007 Acts specify a type of 
emergency that would constitute an emergency invocation, as that would be limiting; however, the 
language of military use in both, and the Emergencies Act section III and IV which outline emergency 
capacity in the event of international violence or force, or war with Canada and/or its allies (respectively), 
strongly suggest that federal emergencies commonly involve national or international conflict.  
 Invocation of a national emergency under these Acts comes when the provinces are assumed to 
be incapable of handling an emergency alone and require a unifying force (Swiffen 2020). A push for 
emergency management unity, however, should not be necessarily predicated by war. Provincial unity on 
climate emergency policy is difficult for reasons of political partisanship outlined in the previous section 





acknowledge it, made possible as some Conservative premiers have opted out of carbon-pricing or 
emission reductions (Wells 2018). A unified, democratic response to climate change is required in order 
to mitigate, prepare, respond and recover. In conversation with climate activist Naomi Klein, sociologist 
Barry Smart (2020) writes, “Fixing things will require … the practice of a form of government that is able 
to implement policy initiatives that prioritise the commons” (28-29). As the Canadian commons begins to 
grapple with the effects of a warming climate and increases in extreme weather events, such as the 
deadly 2018 Quebec heat wave or the more frequent wildfires devastating western provinces, the unity 
of a national emergency may be required in order to enact comprehensive policy. 
 A national climate emergency would not only mean federal policy, however, as the invocation 
would result in further measures to be taken by provincial and municipal governments. The provincial 
emergency legislation in Ontario is formally limited to one Act, however the municipal legislative footprint 
also alludes to emergency powers and autonomy for municipalities. The Emergency Management and 
Civil Protection Act, 1990 greatly emphasizes the responsibility of municipalities during emergencies, 
dedicating section 2.1, section 3, and section 4 of the legislation to the guidelines for municipal 
emergency management plans. And while both the province and municipalities are authorized to declare 
emergencies subject to section 7.0.1 and section 4(1), respectively, the authority of the province remains 
stronger and the Premier or Lieutenant Governor may terminate an emergency declaration at any time in 
any place in the province (s 4[4]). The strong powers Ontario’s premier maintains over municipal 
governance are made evident throughout this legislation, especially in section 7 which includes a 
dedicated subsection on “Powers of Premier, municipal powers” (s 7.0.3[2]). The premier has ultimate 
control over any emergency in the province and can delegate chief authority to any minister (s 7.0.4[1]) 
and direct municipal councils to assist other municipalities within the province (s 7.0.3[2b]). While such 
powers granted to the premier may seem authoritarian, section 13.1 (4) provides a necessary and useful 





authorize the payment of the costs incurred by a municipality in respect of an order made under 
this Act out of funds appropriated by the Assembly.” Former Ontario Deputy Minister Michael Fenn 
(Matheson, Fenn & Steele 2020) has stated that the municipal relationship with the province of Ontario is 
fundamentally financial; and this relationship is reliant on its fiscal roots inside and outside of 
emergencies.  
Emergency Policy and Multilevel Governance 
Ontario’s most recent and perhaps most dramatic emergency declaration is ongoing in the midst of the 
2020 COVID-19 pandemic. Bills 187 and 189 from the Legislative Assembly of Ontario were quickly passed 
in the early stages of Ontario’s pandemic response in an effort to support municipalities and their 
residents. Bill 187, the Municipal Emergency Act amends the Municipal Act and the City of Toronto Act to 
allow municipal councils and boards to update procedure bylaws which would allow for electronic 
governance to promote physical distancing. Bill 189, the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Support and Protection 
Act amends meeting schedule timelines legislated under various acts pertaining to municipal 
administration, such as the Development Charges Act (Raponi 2020). These emergency response bills 
provide clarity for municipalities regarding administrative capacity during an extended pandemic 
emergency. In addition to these Bills, the formal emergency declaration on March 17th 2020 heavily 
impacted and continues to impact municipalities and their public health units. The state of emergency 
was invoked under the strong legislative authority of section 7.0.1 of the Emergency Management and 
Civil Protection Act, therefore establishing overarching emergency powers for Premier Doug Ford.  
 The appropriateness or timing of emergency declarations is not debated in this analysis, as 
pandemic emergency governance is a complex political field. The suitability of emergency legislation to 
create and enact climate change adaptation and mitigation policy at the municipal level is what this 
analysis is addressing. Climate change and COVID-19 are not the same. While the negative and deadly 
health impacts of extreme weather and rising global temperatures could be construed to define climate 





imminent non-threat (Smart 2020) has not yet been realized. The emergency response to the 2020 
pandemic, however, does illustrate the willingness to enact broad policy in the absence of a 
comprehensive plan due to the changing nature of the emergency. The emergency response also 
illustrates the means through which the province can invoke ultimate power while addressing the 
intricacies of municipal administration.  
 As part of this administration, Ontario’s 1990 emergency legislation under section 2.1 requires all 
municipalities to create an “emergency management program” including a plan, public communication 
strategies, and staff and council training exercises. Although, by nature, emergencies are difficult to plan 
for, the provincial mandate represents a policy opportunity for municipalities to document a response 
mechanism for climate emergencies. The City of Toronto’s 2017 Emergency Management Plan is a 
comprehensive example of provincially mandated municipal emergency management. The plan defines 
the roles of municipal staff and council, local boards and commissions in the event of an emergency; 
types of emergencies that may be encountered and the degree of response required; and risk assessment 
and response measures. As the types of emergencies outlined include floods, extreme heat or cold 
weather, storms, and fires (2017, 19), the Plan has prepared the City to respond to climate change-
related emergencies. However, the Plan has not been updated since Toronto declared a climate 
emergency in 2019 and does not account for climate change as a threat category (19). This is all to say 
that the framework for climate emergency governance and policy exists in the emergency management 
program footprint set out by the province to which municipalities should adhere. 
 Correspondingly, the municipal autonomy framework need also be discussed in this analysis. 
Despite the understanding that multilevel government cooperation is required for effective climate 
change mitigation and adaptation policy and that policy solutions do not happen in a single-level vacuum, 
municipal autonomy and authority relative to provinces remains limited. The AMO MOU is a decisive 





municipalities. The MOU is a joint agreement between Ontario and the Minister of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing and the AMO on behalf of all Ontario municipalities that emphasizes the need for provincial-
municipal consultation, communication, and coordination on matters related to municipalities and the 
provincial level. The MOU does not grant municipalities decision making authority, but rather equates the 
provincial and municipal voices where municipal policymaking is concerned. The MOU, however, is 
merely a pillar of the climate emergency policy foundation, as emergency cooperation and coordination 
are not mentioned. Though the MOU may be considered a “peacetime” formality, not suitable for times 
of emergency management (Matheson, Fenn & Steele 2020), the organization nevertheless ensures a 
basis of mutual respect between levels of government, acting as a stimulus for further cooperative 
policymaking.  
 Essentially, the broad authority permitted by section 8 of the Municipal Act, along with the 
consultation agreement from the MOU place municipalities in a position of means without wealth – 
Ontario’s municipalities are recognized as having complex governance standards and administrative 
needs in the event of an emergency, yet must be told how and when to act by upper levels of 
government. The policymaking network of emergency management is stepwise, deductive, and highly 
regulated. Municipalities can operate within this network, however constrained they may be. Except 
emergency management programming is rarely at the forefront of a municipal governance agenda as 
emergencies rarely reach a level that requires complete intragovernmental management (Henstra 2013). 
Declarations of climate emergencies follow a similar pattern – municipalities do not have the potential 
actual emergencies associated with climate change at the forefront of their governance agendas due to 
the varied and non-immediate nature of climate change disasters (Fitzgerald 2020, 168). This framing of 
climate change as a policy issue has created a ceremonial and impractical understanding of climate 
emergency management. The climate emergency is an emergency that, based on its identifier, is 





“emergency” is not enough of an emergency, despite it being a catalyst for types of real emergencies 
such as those outlined in Toronto’s Emergency Management Plan. There remains a divide between 
climate emergencies and generally accepted emergencies, in addition to the divide between municipal 
emergency management and provincial emergency invocation. 
Municipal Climate Emergency Declarations 
What is a Climate Emergency? 
Contextualizing policymaking from a legislative perspective outlines the operational reality of 
municipalities succeeding in climate governance and policymaking. Municipalities have been established 
as members of the public service, willing and able to act on matters of decided importance. Both in terms 
of emergency legislation and climate change mitigation and adaptation policy, municipalities are subject 
to the will of upper levels of government, primarily provincial. However, discretionary powers of 
emergency declaration are granted to municipal leaders per section 4(1) of the Emergency Management 
and Civil Protection Act, 1990. Forty-seven Ontario municipalities have declared climate emergencies 
since March 2019; and, while the act may be seen as a symbolic gesture and lacking substantive action, 
declaring a climate emergency remains a method for municipal councils to signal to their communities 
and to other public entities that addressing the impacts of the climate crisis is a necessary consideration 
regarding all matters of governance moving forward. Former Chief Resilience Officer for the City of 
Toronto, Elliott Cappell, understands climate emergency declarations to be “a starting point to getting all 
the different arms of government to move in the same direction … [to] create a shared lingua franca on 
which to work and engage the public on the real scale of the challenge” (Cappell 2019). As all 
departments of municipal governments begin to address climate change, municipal operations will 
change in order to reflect new initiatives, procedures, and policies. Many climate emergency declarations 
made by Ontario municipalities include actions to further invest in and plan for climate change. These 






 Climate emergency declarations have become an increasingly popular way for governments to 
signal their comprehension and capacity of climate change mitigation and adaptation. The 2019 Oxford 
Languages Word of the Year was “climate emergency”, due to the demonstrated “heightened public 
awareness of climate science and the myriad implications for communities around the world” (Oxford 
University Press 2019). Cohen (2020) similarly notes that the rise in governments addressing climate 
change with policy initiatives like Green New Deals also surged in 2019. With governments of all levels 
and sizes around the world beginning to understand the need for diplomacy and governance in reducing 
emissions and gravely altering material consumption patterns, the climate emergency has grown into a 
movement. However, should policy alternatives and climate governance fail to move forward at the pace 
of global average temperature rise, the movement becomes largely symbolic. The symbolic gesture of 
declaring a climate emergency is where many governments face criticism.  
Motivations for Declaring Climate Emergencies. 
Of the 47 municipalities that have declared climate emergencies, motivation is difficult to establish. 
Nearly half (20 out of 47) municipalities referenced the United Nations International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) reports on the necessity of climate change mitigation strategies. While reference points 
such as international data do provide some understanding of how the declarations are decided on, the 20 
municipalities are not unified in any other measure; tier, population, and timing do not have an impact on 
whether or not the IPCC is referenced (see Appendix 1). Additionally, council meeting minutes do not 
indicate a consistent recommendation catalyst, with some municipalities relying on advisory committees, 
some on outside environmental organizations, some on councillors, and one municipality who voted to 
declare a climate emergency based on a deputation from a former chief planner (Municipality of 
Clarington 2020). The City of Kingston, Ontario’s first municipality to declare a climate emergency on 5 
March 2019, was motivated by deputations from a professor and students from Queen’s University’s 
environmental studies program and the co-founders of the Kingston Climate Hub (City of Kingston 2019). 





attributed to the increase in collective understanding throughout the world as residents, councillors, and 
non-government actors attempt to influence the governments they exist under. 
 Even in determining motivation for climate emergency declarations, municipalities such as the 
City of Guelph have actively refused to use the language of the climate emergency due to the often-
perceived virtue signaling of the declaration. In May 2019, the City of Guelph Council met to discuss the 
City’s 2050 renewable energy targets. The first amendment to this discussion sought to have Guelph 
“[acknowledge] the impacts of climate change and [join] citizens, cities and countries around the world in 
declaring a climate emergency” (City of Guelph 2019, 12). This first amendment was further amended 
with a narrowly carried rewording of “the City of Guelph acknowledges the impacts of climate change and 
joins citizens, cities and countries around the world in acknowledging a climate emergency” and further 
amended to read, “the City of Guelph acknowledges the impacts of climate change and joins citizens, 
cities and countries around the world in acknowledging a climate crisis” (13). Choosing to acknowledge a 
climate crisis rather than declare a climate emergency positions Guelph outside of the standard narrative 
but within the linguistic confines of climate change acceptance. Similarly, Prince Edward County motioned 
to amend the wording of their declaration to “climate urgency” rather than an emergency, however 
deputations from the public insisting on a more standardized wording resulted in the resolution, “To 
support other communities that have elected to 'name and frame' this global crisis by officially declaring a 
climate emergency” (Prince Edward County 2019, 12). The Region of Waterloo, as well, cited Guelph’s 
language decision, however ultimately concluded that “utilizing the term emergency over crisis makes it 
part of the global movement and brings it as one voice and stands united with fellow municipalities” 
(Region of Waterloo 2019, 3). Waterloo also worked with a climate communications consultant (21) 






 Lindsay (2010) argues that in liberal states, such as Canada, the climate emergency can be 
understood through the lens of general emergency governance. They note that the scope and allocation 
of power is altered in emergency situations, but also that “emergency government … is a strategic 
condition of the state” (2010, 266). The strategic condition of climate emergency governance has not yet 
been established; that is to say, the strategy for the circumstance of a climate emergency is not complete 
at any level of government. The Ontario municipal strategy for climate emergencies currently is to 
normalize climate emergency declarations, expand the movement as Waterloo’s reasoning suggests, and 
follow with climate emergency actions. The climate emergency, when treated as an emergency and not a 
declaration, allows for policy planning and implementation (Lindsay 2010, 280). Lindsay further writes 
that “the evidentiary burden for abstention from emergency action” falls on those who do not accept the 
condition of the climate emergency and possibly on those who do not see policymaking value in 
emergency governance powers (274). 
 To declare a climate emergency as a municipality in Ontario is to both accept the reality of the 
climate crisis and join a global movement that aims to collectively act on mitigation and adaptation 
strategies. Municipal emergency powers are limited by the provincial government, however the 
conditions of emergency powers under a climate emergency declaration are unknown and therefore not 
subject to the same limitations. As municipalities move forward with gestures of international 
compliance, policy capacity will grow. Addressing climate change as an emergency results in urgency 
framing and requires an evaluation of the issue from an innovative perspective. 
Policy Capacity Analysis and Measures 
The legislative capacity for policymaking, however significant it may be, is one measure of many where 
emergency preparedness and management aptitude and power are concerned. For example, municipal 
policymaking capacity for economic development programs in Ontario’s Greater Golden Horseshoe 





stores or reduce the number of cars permitted to drive on municipal roadways. Formally, “capacity refers 
to the amount of professional and budgetary resources that are available to an entity to carry out a 
process, and the degree of sophistication with which the process is carried out” (Loh 2015, 134). Policy 
capacity requires even more than corporate resources, however, as the policy process also demands a 
constant operational commitment from council, staff and those impacted by the policy itself. The policy 
process is unlike that of a municipal procedure or project, to which Loh applies the definition of 
operational capacity quoted above. Rather, the process is ongoing with no clear conception or conclusion 
measures, as policies and policy solutions are conceived from problems, evaluations, solutions, and 
projections (Henstra 2010). This section proposes potential policy capacity measures based on how the 
climate emergency has been approached thus far, how municipalities have successfully maintained good 
governance, and how emergency policy has been enacted (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Climate Emergency Policy Capacity Matrix 
Climate Emergency Policy Capacity 









Coordination Theories of Capacity  
Taylor (2016) Good Governance 
Theory 
 x x x 
Comfort (2007) Crisis 
Management Theory 
x x   
Henstra and Thistlethwaite 
(2017) Risk Management 
Theory 
x x x  
Labadie (2011) Adaptive 
Capacity Theory 






As proposed in Table 2, policy capacity measures align with four varied theories of municipal governance 
capacity, discussed in detail below. Though not comprehensive of climate emergency policy responses 
nor governance capacity theories, the Matrix provides a lens through which the policy examples in the 
proceeding section may be viewed. These measures differ from the theories to which they are compared, 
as they are not as theoretically exclusive. The four theories of capacity each offer their own measures of 
policy capacity to determine municipal capacity in areas of efficient flood risk management (such as with 
Henstra and Thistlethwaite [2017]) or emergency communication (such as with Comfort [2007]). The 
capacity measures listed above offer a broader scope of emergency capacity that relies on the individual 
specific measures presented by other emergency and governance theorists. Essentially, this matrix 
provides a foundation for the novel climate change policy network being developed through new climate 
emergency discussions and declarations. 
Capacity Measures (x-axis) 
Four probable measures of capacity are measured alongside four governance capacity theories varying in 
scope and theme. The measures of capacity are based on available data on effective climate change 
mitigation and adaptation action and include: a collective, community-driven effort to reduce the 
negative impacts of climate change, known as an Advocacy Coalition (Heinmiller and Pirak 2016); both 
multi-level government cooperation and financing; and a network of policy framing initiatives that place 
climate policy as a solution in multiple venues and agendas. As noted throughout this analysis, climate 
change mitigation and adaptation efforts are ineffective unless performed at a large scale, with broad 
commitment from leaders and followers (Gaddy, Clark and Ryan 2014). When reduced, Loh’s definition of 
municipal operational capacity essentially refers to the willingness of government actors and leaders to 
dedicate resources to matters of significance. Based on the formality (and in some cases, contention) of 
climate emergency declarations, 47 of Ontario’s municipalities, including the those with the largest 
populations such as Toronto, the Region of Peel, and Waterloo Region, are willing to dedicate knowledge, 





 Where this analysis continues is with the four additional measures of capacity to supplement the 
baseline of operational will. The first measure, community support and advocacy, is derived from the 
notion that climate change solutions must be a collective effort. The Advocacy Coalition Framework as 
studied by Heinmiller and Pirak (2016), while in the context of land use policy, offers insight into how 
community support can effectively manifest government action and change. The authors write that 
advocacy coalitions are useful in policy situations involving “wicked problems”, which climate change 
mitigation and adaptation may be characterized as. The air of disagreement and/or distrust surrounding 
wicked problems allows community support to provide the political backing for policy decision (2016, 
172). The study concludes that community support, when coordinated and collaborative in advocacy 
coalitions, represents a powerful voice in the policy process. Advocacy coalitions are defined as groups of 
“likeminded policy actors” capable of engaging in “substantive collective action” (169). Additionally, 
Henstra (2018) suggests “the range of feasible policy solutions available to municipal governments is 
influenced by pressure groups, such as neighbourhood associations, community service clubs and 
merchant’s associations” (127), further broadening the requirements for meaningful community impact 
on local policymaking. A recently formed community of policy actors, the signatories of the 2020 
Declaration for Resilience in Canadian Cities, presents a clear example of a climate change action 
advocacy coalition as group of former and current government professionals who are committed to 
influencing planning and development policy in cities from an environmentally conscious perspective. 
Community advocacy and leadership is a democratic means of policy influence, reliant on elected and 
electing members of the public, and is therefore a necessary measure of climate change policy capacity. 
 The second and third measures each deal with intergovernmental relations. Multilevel 
cooperation and multilevel financing are divided in order to illustrate the difference between a 
collaborative, intergovernmental network of policy options and a network of financial support. They do, 





in determining where and how municipalities may authorize discretion. Regarding the need for a 
cooperative and collaborative policy options network, municipalities are reliant on upper levels of 
government for their operational scope, as noted in the previous discussion of the Municipal Act. 
Although the scope is broadly defined and interpretable in order to give municipalities broad authority to 
govern as they see fit, intergovernmental cooperation provides a stronger basis for policy implementation 
with regard to matters of international significance such as the climate emergency. Political and 
environmental scientists such as Daniel Cohen (2020) argue for an interdisciplinary and 
intergovernmental approach to climate change mitigation and adaptation policy, going so far as to write 
that government policy at all levels “implicate[s] urban spaces in subtle and obvious ways” (60-61), 
therefore demanding an intersectional, collaborative approach from all levels of government (57). 
Rachael Krause (2011) writes that in the context of local policymaking for climate change action, 
“financial and technical capacity … is a key determinant of … policy decisions” (49). Krause objectively 
speaks to the necessity of intergovernmental financial cooperation, as the variation in municipal self-
finance is wide. The smallest municipality (based on population size) that has declared a climate 
emergency in Ontario is the Town of Goderich with less than 10000 residents, while the largest 
municipality, the City of Toronto, is the largest city not only in Ontario, but in Canada with nearly three 
million residents (see Table 1). Available revenue from property taxes and user fees would thus be 
extremely varied (Henstra 2018, 123). For this reason, financial support from the federal government, 
such as assistance from the aforementioned Canada Infrastructure Bank, or the provincial government 
through grants or transfers is required. As well, the strong stipulations surrounding intergovernmental 
financial transfers (Juillet and Koji 2014, 53) requires collaboration in order to properly and ethically 
allocate government dollars.  
 While the previous three measures deal with the pre-policy conception process, the final 





and adaptation policies. The introduction of climate emergency declarations to Ontario municipalities in 
March 2019 means the issue is relatively new to the municipal policy agenda, and therefore must be 
framed in a manner that demonstrates the necessity of policy initiatives without presenting the novelty 
as a barrier (Peters 2015, 76). Agenda-setting and venue-shopping are common terms in the policy 
process that refer to the act of having a solution be adopted as a policy on certain agendas and in certain 
venues in order to have the solution adopted forthright. As a measure of capacity, these terms are 
defined in a different manner. Climate change adaptation and mitigation does not have a single solution 
and is not a single-venue/-agenda issue; rather, climate change policy capacity must incorporate agenda 
and venue variances into its solutions. Essentially, if community support is a resource, and if 
intergovernmental cooperation and financing are resources, then the broad scope of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation is a resource. Climate change policies impact the policy networks of many 
municipal operations including development, tourism, housing, water/wastewater operations, and solid 
waste management (Carvalho 2018, 8). Similar to Kingdon’s multiple streams analysis of policy 
development which assumes a congruence of problems, solutions, and political will is necessary to create 
policy (Béland and Howlett 2016), this capacity measure assumes the necessity of intragovernmental 
recognition of the climate emergency in order to create policy. 
Capacity Theories (y-axis) 
Some or all of the four measures described above are related or applicable to theories of municipal 
governance. Each theory proposes a set of competencies which the respective authors deem necessary 
for leadership. Comfort (2007), Labadie (2011), and Henstra and Thistlethwaite (2017) offer measures of 
governance capacity in the event of crises and emergencies, while Taylor (2016) offers a number of 
measures related to “good governance” in general. The theories are outlined in the following discussion 
and applied to the four capacity measures in the Climate Emergency Policy Matrix (Table 2) in order to 





 Taylor’s 2016 article “Good Governance at the Local Level” defines common competencies of 
municipal governance and applies the elements of “good” quality governance structure to Canadian and 
Ontario governments. Taylor defines six dimensions and three supplemental determinants of “process 
quality”, referring to the quality of policy making and subsequently the governance structure itself (2016, 
6-8).  The six dimensions include: “inclusivity, accountability, impartiality, administrative competence, 
learning capacity, and efficiency [or] timeliness” (6-7) and are generally measured by evaluating policy 
outcomes and service delivery efficiency, despite the undetermined utility of policy evaluation (26). The 
supplemental determinants are: “formal rules … organizational norms … and institutional capacity” (8). 
While understood as a single capacity measure for the purpose of this analysis, the difference between 
the dimensions and the determinants is that the six dimensions impact the development of policy, while 
the three determinants are impacted by the policy decision. The dimensions and determinants, however, 
represent a broad model of governance measurement for total process quality review.  
 This comprehensive governance evaluation model serves to assist municipalities in determining 
organizational productivity and utility as a measure of “good governance” (2016, 29). When compared 
with the properties of the climate emergency capacity measures, good governance concepts are 
necessary for intergovernmental cooperation and financing, as well as agenda/venue coordination. Taylor 
(2016) notes the significant “embeddedness” in the municipal policy process, as local governments are 
constitutionally linked to the financial whims of the province (14) and more broadly embedded in 
“multilevel governance arrangements (15) as a facet of their existence. Good governance relies on 
cooperation with other levels and bodies of government, and therefore also may be theoretically applied 
to climate emergency policy practice in the two cooperation-derived measures of capacity. As well, the 
dimensions and determinants of good governance focus on the policy process of high-quality 
governments. Part of this process, found in the dimensions and determinants, involves understanding 





accounted for throughout the process (8). Climate emergency policy must too account for a number of 
external circumstances, allowing the good governance theory to align with the fourth measure of climate 
emergency capacity. 
 Comfort’s (2007) analysis of crisis management tactics posits that emergency response success is 
determined by four factors: cognition, communication, coordination, and control (189). The theory is 
founded on an acknowledgement of “the importance of both design and self-organizing action in guiding 
coordinated action” in the event of a crisis or emergency (195) as well as Comfort’s notion that disaster 
management requires a collective coordination and adaptation (192). The community- and collaborative-
driven approach to emergency management aligns the crisis management theory with the advocacy 
coalition and intergovernmental cooperation measures, as both are rooted in a collective response. In a 
similar vein of emergency management theory, Henstra and Thistlethwaite’s (2017) risk management 
theory studies the response to floods and climate change-related disasters in Canada to promote a 
shared responsibility model of risk control. The authors suggest that, due to the inevitability of climate 
change-related emergencies, risks must be shared by the community and its governing bodies. The 
“burden of loss”, the “responsibility for risk reduction”, and the “costs of risk reduction” must be shared 
(28). Similar to Comfort (2007), Henstra and Thistlethwaite (2017) align with the advocacy coalition and 
intergovernmental cooperation measures, though they also align with the measure of intergovernmental 
financing as the explicit “costs of risk reduction” as well as the implicit funding for the “burden of loss” 
would require financial assistance (10). Finally, Labadie’s (2011) adaptive capacity theory of emergency 
management is also specifically directed toward climate change mitigation and adaptation as it measures 
the response capability of a system to variations in climate by evaluating economic resources, the 
strength of government, infrastructure quality, and the strength of social protections (1253). Labadie’s 
theory measures the response capacity of a system, such as a government, and therefore falls into the 





 Due to the four capacity measures theorized in the previous section of this analysis being 
supported through some means by multiple existing governance capacity theories, the matrix of climate 
emergency capacity is therefore grounded in existing emergency management and governance literature. 
This analysis considers the ways in which the growing number of Ontario municipalities can use their 
limited authority to enact policy change through climate emergency declarations. Provided that a 
municipal government can measure its capacity through the lens of one of the four presented theories of 
governance, the municipality could assess the strength of their community support, intergovernmental 
support, and policy framing techniques in order to determine its climate emergency policymaking 
capacity. The following discussion presents a number of climate emergency policy examples from 
governments and advocacy groups that are supported by the four measures of climate emergency 
capacity. 
Policy Examples 
Based on a review of council meetings minutes from each Ontario municipality that declared a climate 
emergency between March 2019 and March 2020, common motivating factors include community 
support to join the global movement of local government climate emergency action, or support from 
council and environmental advisory committees regarding national and international reporting on climate 
change action (see Appendix 1). Additionally, Sara Hughes (2017) writes that cities are independently 
motivated to enact climate change policies due in part to the “unique set of capacities and political 
opportunities” for mitigation and adaptation tactics available to urban governments (2-3). As these reflect 
the character of the necessary capacity measures of climate emergency action, such as community 
advocacy and intergovernmental consensus support, the policy process for Ontario’s climate-conscious 
municipalities appears well-suited for upcoming policy solutions. While still novel and largely symbolic, 
the lack of capital commitment for policies directly tied to climate emergency declarations does not 
negate the social impact of the declarations (Henstra 2018). Direct municipal climate change mitigation 





evaluations; however, climate change policies do not require emergency declarations to be implemented, 
as demonstrated by the following examples of policy entrepreneurship. 
 American examples from large cities such as New York City’s plaNYC and Boston’s Greenovate 
Boston initiative are large-scale examples of municipal-community-state partnership that have led to 
policy solutions in green infrastructure development, environmentally-conscious zoning, solid waste 
reduction, and carbon emissions reduction (plaNYC 2011; Greenovate Boston 2020). Although these 
initiatives continue to grow in both acclaim and outcome success, the scale and structure of American 
metropolis governance is not easily replicated in Ontario. Rather, Ontario’s municipalities benefit from a 
strong network of institutional advocacy through organizations such as AMO and the Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities (FCM). AMO has been a partner of municipalities throughout the 2010s regarding 
local climate change leadership. Although no advocacy has been documented since Ontario municipalities 
began declaring climate emergencies in March 2019, AMO has helped to establish provincial agreements 
and legislation on the municipal role in climate change policymaking, such as the Climate Change and Low 
Carbon Economy Act, 2016 and Ontario’s Climate Action Plan (AMO 2016; 2018). FCM continues to 
dedicate a substantial portfolio of resources to municipal climate action, as one of their defined focus 
areas. Programs such as the Green Municipal Fund, Municipalities for Climate Innovation, and Partners 
for Climate Protection connect Canadian municipalities with each other and with the advocacy efforts of 
FCM in order to strengthen the capacity and response of local government climate change policymaking 
(FCM 2020b). 
 With the exception of Toronto, the remaining 46 municipalities committed to climate change 
action do not possess comparable resources or infrastructure to engage in interdisciplinary policy action 
similar to New York City or Boston. However, although Hughes (2017) primarily studies the success of 
urban city climate initiatives, they also note the social, often immeasurable success of programs such as 





adaptation policy is part of a “behavioural change with the city government” and requires programming 
for “increased resource allocation to climate change programs, increased inter-agency collaboration, and 
energy conservation in municipal activities” (11). The network provided by organizations like AMO and 
FCM strengthen the advocacy power of local government at the federal and provincial levels, yet the 
network also provides the opportunity for municipalities learn from one another. Although network 
theory in policymaking is negatively associated with a crowd of policy actors each looking to individually 
benefit from and contribute to policy design (Peters 2015, 89), the policy examples that have resulted 
from AMO and FCM networking place implementation responsibility with municipal actors rather than 
with the community (ICLEI 2020, 4; 8-9).  
 City-specific initiatives are not individually reported on by FCM and AMO’s latest documented 
climate advocacy action occurred in 2018, prior to Ontario’s municipal climate declarations being made. 
The number of emergency declarations in Ontario steadily increased in the year between the first 
declaration and the latest (Figure 1). However, following March 2020 municipal priorities have shifted 
from climate emergency management to pandemic emergency management.  The shift in priorities is 
justified by the need for immediate resource allocation to public health. However, in the same way that 
climate emergency policy demands an interdisciplinary and collaborative approach, the pandemic 
response has proved that municipal operations cannot operate independent of one another. A recent and 
notable addition to the municipal climate change policy response is the 2020 Declaration for Resilience in 
Canadian Cities from former City of Toronto Chief Planner Jennifer Keesmaat. FCM and AMO provide, and 
have been providing, both capital and information resources for municipalities to address climate change 
before the impacts were considered emergencies; and, while the work of these municipal organizations 
has driven municipalities to program and policy success, the climate emergency demands a more 
innovative response. Similar to the novelty of climate emergency declaration, the 2020 Declaration 





change and act on their declarations based on community momentum and the assumption that “a 
coordinated effort by the federal government, provinces, and cities … can repair a half-century of 
unsustainable planning that has compromised our health, access to housing, the quality of our air and 
water, and the long-term financial viability of our cities” (Keesmaat 2020). The 2020 Declaration is 
supported by a number of local mayors and planners as well as many planning and environmental science 
professionals. This type of broad community advocacy combined with the demand for intergovernmental 
cooperation and a focus on framing the climate emergency as a subsequent challenge to COVID-19 
presents municipalities with an opportunity to align their initial declarations with the proposed policy 
changes of the 2020 Declaration.  
 Policy solutions will vary for municipalities moving forward in assessing their role in climate action 
and their capacity for policy action. The climate emergency is, for Ontario municipalities, a policy 
opportunity. From a governance and policymaking perspective, solutions require more than simply a 
problem to solve—policy solutions are made possible by political will, operational means, and 
contextualization by policymakers that rationalizes “a preferred interpretation of social reality…for policy 
intervention” (Juillet and Koji 2014, 43). The growing popularity of climate emergency declarations proves 
the will exists and the FCM and AMO have continuously provided resources for operational means. 
Climate Emergencies at the municipal level are shrouded by doubt of meaningful action due to the 
constitutional nature of local government. This analysis, however, outlines the legislative context and re-
framing opportunity for climate change policy to develop and be implemented through an emergency 
framework. 
Conclusion 
The climate emergency will only grow in urgency and gravity moving forward, making it the defining 
international issue of the 21st century (Foster 2020). Each national, provincial, regional, and municipal 





the people they govern. Planning for the impact of a climate emergency is not an issue of left-leaning or 
democratic governments. Policy intended to help communities mitigate and adapt to increased flood 
seasons, wildfires, droughts, food shortages, and infrastructure damage is an issue of governments that 
have developed the capacity to respond to the emergency. Thomas Beamish (2020) defines climate 
change as a “crescive” problem and in the “genre” of pandemic catastrophe, consistent with “the human 
tendency to avoid dealing with problems … until they manifest as acute traumas” (217). The psychology 
of climate change acceptance is widely studied and not included in this analysis, yet the consideration for 
the delayed emergency response should be given to governments who have demonstrated their capacity. 
 The purpose of this analysis is to determine the policymaking ability of municipalities in Ontario 
and how the municipalities that have recently declared climate change can move forward within the 
policymaking network available to local governments. By reviewing the legislative context of policymaking 
initially, the normative albeit limited municipal policy system is established as a malleable option through 
which municipalities may move forward with policymaking. More conclusively, the policy capacity matrix 
represents both the theoretical aspect of municipal emergency governance alongside possible measures 
of capacity. Municipalities may rely on previously established theories of governing in order to determine 
capacity, or conversely may rely on known capacity measures to determine gaps in policy capacity that 
can be filled through theoretical study. 
 Although currently halted while municipalities address COVID-19 and financial issues, the steady 
growth in the number of municipalities declaring climate change between the first and most recent 
suggests that as local governments become more accustomed to the current emergency, they will 
continue with addressing the future emergency. Further research and evaluation of municipal climate 
emergency declarations will have the resources to focus on the content of related policies and action 
directly related to the declarations once the policy process is realized in implemented actions. 





the climate emergency is considered by the Provincial legislature as a threatening emergency comparable 
to those experienced in 2020. Emergency governance has traditionally been an afterthought of many 
governments, however, just as municipalities have made policymaking normative in the face of ambiguity, 
ongoing uncertainty may push governments to consider emergency strategies in a more consistent and 
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Appendix 1: Municipal Council Meeting Minutes Review 
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